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Abstract: 
 
This paper examines  the relationship between constitutionalism and New Methods off 
Governance (NMG) in the EU. It argues that in many respects the relationship is one which 
tends to challenge, marginalise or misrepresent NMG In particular, those state-derivative 
aspects of constitutionalism in the EU which emphasize  the themes of hierarchy and self-
containment threaten respectively to consign  NMG to a position of minor significance and to 
ignore the potential of NMG as a bridge between European and national systems. 
Alternatively, a  more reflexive approach to constitutionalism which retains the state-
derivative idea of constitutionalism as a realization, and indeed as a form of mobilization,  of 
political community, but discards some of this command and control orthodoxies as 
inappropriate to a more institutionally dispersed and socially responsive polity promises to 
capture the normative potential of NMG more effectively 
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 Constitutionalism and New Governance in the European Union: 
Rethinking the Boundaries* 
 
Neil Walker 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There are many and contested ways of defining both constitutionalism and new governance in 
the context of the European Union, and  even more and  more variously contested ways of 
defining the relationship between these two notions. Part of my purpose in this essay will be 
to map what I see as  five key candidate relationships between constitutionalism and New 
Governance - or, if you like, the key dimensions of the relationship between constitutionalism 
and new governance,  and to explain why  each of them tells us something of importance 
about the peculiar regulatory dynamic of the European Union. The sketch, then,  is a 
cumulative one rather than a series of alternative visions, for even if some of the  possible 
relationships set out are in mutual tension, each addresses  a connection (or a disconnection) 
which speaks plausibly  to one aspect of the EU’s situation. My  purpose, however, is not 
merely cartographical. I also want to suggest that the first four possible relationships 
discussed – namely subsumption, instrumentalization, non-correspondence and structural 
antagonism -  are all finally limiting relationships. Each plays on a different dimension of the 
weakness or myopia of the constitutional paradigm in the European Union, and its failure to 
grasp new governance fully, as well as upon a certain overemphasis on  “definition-by-
contrast”1  and a consequent  fuzziness  over the content and significance of the ‘new’ within 
the  notion of New Governance itself.  The fifth possible relationship, which flows from the 
insight that constitutionalism’s historic connection to the idea of responsible self-government 
requires to be rethought for the postnational domain, holds out the possibility that 
constitutionalism need not be viewed in these limiting terms and, accordingly, that New 
Governance’s horizons of innovation  need neither be limited by these limiting terms nor 
depend on the wholesale rejection of  constitutional discourse. It inquires instead into the 
more profound transformative possibilities for both constitutionalism and New Governance of  
a deeper level of mutual engagement. 
 
2. Constitutionalism and New Governance: Moveable Objects in a Limiting  Frame  
 
First, though, as a prelude to examining the various candidate  relationship between 
constitutionalism and New Governance, we must address a more basic puzzle. If, as already 
suggested,  both constitutionalism and New Governance are objects whose definition is vague 
and highly diverse, in what sense can the normal range of conceptions of the relationship 
between them nevertheless  be seen as limiting? To answer this question requires some 
investigation of the way in which the discourses both of constitutionalism and of New 
Governance have developed in the EU context. 
(i) European  Constitutionalism 
                                                          
* Forthcoming in G. De Burca and J Scott (eds) , New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism (Oxford: Hart) 
1
  G. De Burca and J. Scott,  “New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism” (present volume). 
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Let us first consider constitutionalism.  Four themes in the historical development of 
European constitutionalism are  worth emphasizing for present purposes.  These are in turn 
nominalism, textualism,  hierarchy and  self-containment. 
By nominalism we mean, simply, the tendency for constitutionalism to  become 
anything or everything anyone claims it to be. Even at the state level, constitutionalism is a 
highly open-ended discourse, and this is due to a combination of its ideological potency and 
its wide range of options and  inherent contentiousness as a form of social technology or 
praxis. Its ideological potency consists in  the added symbolic value to be derived from 
claiming for ones political preferences  the weight  of  constitutional authority.2 In turn, the 
special gravitas of constitutional authority  rests upon its capacity to speak, often 
simultaneously, to one or both of two powerfully affirmative if apparently divergent  
legitimating traditions in the making and sustaining of modern  political community.3 
Constitutionalism invokes, first, a tradition of universalism, or at least of universalizability – 
the idea  that constitutional claims are good claims because since the birth of modern 
constitutionalism and the preambles of the first Constitutional Charters in 19th century 
America and France they have often purported to speak to norms or principle of good 
government and social organization which hold or should hold everywhere and for everyone, 
with any specific claim also an instantiation of the universal. Yet constitutionalism invokes, 
secondly,  just as  weighty a tradition of  particularism, here responding to an equally 
powerful emphasis in the origins of modern statehood on the  specificity of each societas4 and 
its sovereign,  and on the peculiarity and special moral status of the claims that members of 
the same polity can make inter se.  Here the strength of the constitutional claim lies in its 
being exclusively  or especially  well suited to, and indeed often already firm embedded 
within and corroborated by the law or mores of a particular  polity. 
 Constitutionalism’s inherent contentiousness as a form of social technology concerns 
the understandable degree of divergence about what counts as and what may be manipulated 
as ‘constitutive’ within a polity, regardless of whether we take a universalistic  or 
particularistic view of that polity. At the basic social-technological level constitutionalism 
produces a three-level puzzle - normative, epistemic and  motivational.5 Normatively, this has 
to do with the basic aims of the constitution, the version or versions of the good society it 
want to effect or endorse. Epistemically, it  has to do with an understanding of the key 
generative mechanisms – or self-understanding -  of the political society in question. 
Motivationally, it has to do with the capacity of the constitution to encourage human agents to 
activate these generative mechanisms and to provide them with institutions which enable 
them to do so  in a way that is consistent with the constitution’s normative aspirations.  If we 
see a constitution as a  “model”6 of political community, this interweaving of the normative, 
the epistemic and the motivational becomes clearer. A constitution is a model in the double 
sense of referring back to and representing in miniature what is the supposed basis of affinity 
of that community, whether  ethnicity, common culture, common values or shared 
predicament  (epistemic question),  and projecting forwards by  supplying the means towards 
                                                          
2
  See e.g. N. Walker, “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism” (2002) 65  MLR 317-359, at 331-3. 
3
  P. Kahn The Reign of Law, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997)  
4
 R. Jackson, “Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape” (1999) 67 
Political Studies 431-456, 441-444. 
5
 For a study of the interaction of the epistemic and motivational dimensions in EU constitutionalism, with 
particular reference to the debate over the Constitutional Treaty, see N. Walker “Europe’s Constitutional 
momentum and the Idea of Polity Legitimacy” (2005) 3  I*CON 211-238.  
6
 N. Walker  “The EU as a Constitutional Project” Federal Trust Online Papers 19/04. 
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(motivational question)  the realization of  the substantive aspirations of the polity as 
conceived in ideal terms (normative question). With such a range of controversial questions 
in play, even in the most well-established state constitutional order the scope for genuine 
contention, and for ideological struggle over the  symbolically precious resource of 
constitutionalism as to what lies at its constitutive core, becomes apparent.  
In the context of a post-state polity such as the EU, the mix of high ideological stakes 
and contentiousness at the level of social technology invites an even more rampant 
nominalism. As the debate over the EU’s first documentary Constitution7 has underlined, the 
very idea that the EU is the type of entity that ought to be conceived in constitutional terms is 
itself a matter of ideological controversy. It is bound up, on the one hand,  with the traditional 
link between constitutionalism and statehood, and with the sceptical fear that the adoption of 
a Constitution might imply or prefigure a partial, incipient or aspiring statehood for the EU, 
and on the other hand, with the efforts of the more integration-minded to bootstrap the 
authority of a relatively new, original and politically vulnerable polity.8 As the failure of the 
French and Dutch ratification referendums in the early summer of 2005 and the subsequent 
decision by the June European Council to put the Constitution into deep-freeze9 indicates, 
that  threshold controversy over whether European constitutionalism dare speak its name is 
by no means resolved. It is also  the case, however,  that the sheer momentum of the 
constitutional debate has encouraged many across the spectrum of  enthusiasm for integration 
-  including those most avowedly concerned to combat creeping European statehood and so 
more  interested in constitutionalism’s authority-restraining rather than its authority-enabling 
properties10- to endorse a  constitutional discourse as the most appropriate and persuasive in 
which to register their particular conception of the sources, mechanism, purposes and limits 
of  EU governance ( and, indeed, to do so regardless even of whether such a conception 
involves the reduction of the constitution to a canonical written text.).11  That is to say, 
notwithstanding the current stand-off over the Constitutional Treaty, the symbolic allure of 
the constitutional prize has tended to cause  the fabric of  constitutional argument to stretch 
rather than tear. And this is reinforced by the sheer novelty of the EU constitutional debate, 
the  openness of the constitutional field to diverse claims encouraged by the lack of  any prior 
self-proclaimed  constitutional text for the EU, and the absence of the discipline associated 
with the obligation to ground claims in the interpretation or critique of any such ‘living’ text.  
To this  ideological and practical mix  we should add the genuine normative, 
epistemic and motivational difficulty of modelling a constitution on the basis of any relevant 
‘constitutional universal’ for a non-state polity. Where neither the prior cultural or political 
supports associated with the  state (as the normal instantiation of that ‘constitutional 
universal’), nor, relatedly, the mobilizing power which law may tap by reference to  these 
forms of prior or incipient affinity, nor even the comprehensiveness of  political vision 
associated with the state, are available, or at least not on the same terms or to the same 
                                                          
7
 OJ (C 310) Dec. 16th 2004 (hereinafter ‘CT’). 
8
 See e.g. Walker n5 above. 
9
 By providing for a period of a year in which Member States might reflect on the progress of ratification, and 
by extending the ratification deadline from Autumn 2006 to Summer 2007.  
10
 As in the famous  conversion of the traditionally Eurosceptic Economist magazine to the idea of a European 
Constitution  - a conversion entirely contingent upon the endorsement of a power-constraining  version of the 
Charter of Rights See The Economist, 4 November 2000. 
11
 Of many examples, see the works of Richard Bellamy asserting a broader framework of ‘political 
constitutionalism’ against a text-centred constitutional politics; e.g., “The Constitution of Europe: Rights or 
Democracy?’ in R. Bellamy, V. Bufacchi and D. Castiglione (eds) Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the 
Union of Europe(London: Lothian Foundation, 1995)  153-175.  
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degree,12 then the extent to which European constitutionalism remains uncharted territory 
becomes clearer, as does the potential for promiscuous  constitutional ‘naming and claiming.’  
European constitutionalism, in short, has become a  protean discourse whose ideological 
currency is as inflated as its social-technological foundations are unstable, and for that reason 
is susceptible to  highly strategic and opportunistic forms of nominalism. 
The second salient feature of contemporary constitutional discourse in the EU  is its 
textualism. Here the solipsism of nominalism is replaced - or more often complemented - by 
the superficiality of text-dependence. In the case of the current Constitutional Treaty, 
textualism is in fact a product of formalism. Just because  we finally may have a text in the 
appropriate form – one which (in the increasingly unlikely event of its unanimous ratification 
and implementation) is self-understood and self-authorized as a Constitution, or at least as a 
hybrid Constitutional Treaty - the question of what is or is not constitutional becomes 
resolved in the document itself. Alternatively, and perhaps more pertinently given the likely 
failure of the Constitutional Treaty,  in the  claims that the prior and extant treaty structure 
already constitutes a constitution of sorts, textualism is underpinned  by a kind of materialism 
– an emphasis upon the matter rather than the spirit of the constitution.13 On this view, the 
fact that the Treaty texts already contain   some of the familiar materials of a written 
constitution, in particular a detailed organogram of governmental power and of its checks and 
balances,  is enough to validate their  constitutional quality and pedigree regardless of 
whether their underlying motivation and telos is in any sense similar to that commonly found 
in the case of other written (state) constitutions.  
Yet underlying both formalist and materialist variants there is of course a 
preoccupation with political power. Constitutionalism seen through a textualist lens finally 
amounts to no more and no less than what succeeds in making it into the documentary  
Constitution or quasi-Constitution. As with nominalism, so too with textualism, therefore the 
novelty of the idea of a Constitution beyond or without a state favours an open-ended 
discourse,  even if it is not the mere wish but rather the  (putative)  textual command that  is 
crucial in the latter  case.  Moreover, again as with nominalism, the emphasis is on the 
emergence of the (formally authoritative) word rather than its implementation. A textualist 
approach begs the question of the impact of the text, and since, as we have seen, the  
difficulties of developing a relevant social technology for understanding the nature and limits 
of the generative power of constitutionalism are even more formidable for the post-state than 
for the state polity, this is a very large question to beg.  
If the first two themes of European constitutionalism involve a manifest but rather 
shallow, and so permissive, borrowing from the state constitutional tradition, the statist 
legacy of the third and fourth themes is less apparent and often less  consciously realized,  but 
ultimately more profound and constraining   Hierarchy and self-containment are the more 
venerable and more strongly established  and officially endorsed  themes of  constitutionalism 
in the EU context. For the jurisprudence of supremacy, direct effect, implied powers etc., 
developed by the ECJ from the 1960s onwards, and the notion of incipient 
constitutionalization which grew alongside this14 is first and foremost concerned with the 
assertion of the authority and integrity  of the new legal order qua legal order.  
                                                          
12
  Walker, n5 above. 216-222. 
13
 As in Weiler’s idea of a “constitution without constitutionalism”; see J.H.H.Weiler, The Constitution of 
Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 1999) ch.1 
14
 See e.g. P. Craig, “Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the European Union,” (2001) 7 ELJ 125-150. at 128-
135. 
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The operative logic underpinning that process of self-assertion is at root of a 
traditional Kelsenian variety. It is about the positing of authoritative foundations and 
differentiating other norms in accordance with the pedigree provided by these foundations 
The legal order of the EU unfolds from the self-assuming “judicial kompetenz-kompetenz”15 
of the Court in an elaborate chain of validity which encompasses different levels of norms 
within the Treaty-based European order  as well as the supremacy or priority of  EU norms 
over national norms.  The conception of legal hierarchy contained in this model in fact 
contains two distinct implications. The first is that higher-order norms trump lower-order 
ones in cases of  conflict. The second is that the higher order norms generate the lower-order 
norms. This formal property of the legal system, moreover,   has an important institutional 
complement,  in that the legal-normative hierarchy has also generated and is in practice 
articulated through and reinforced  by an institutional hierarchy, one in which the key law-
making institutions (Commission, Parliament and Council) and methods are situated towards 
the apex of the pyramid, and indeed other institutional features of the legal order – 
adjudication, administration ad monitoring also tend to follow a ‘top-down’ command-and-
control logic.   
If hierarchy provides the  operative logic of the new legal order, then self-containment 
is  its basic premise and  self-prophesizing conclusion. The idea that the constitution 
‘contains’  its legal order16  has closely related internal and external dimensions.   Internally, 
it implies that the higher ‘constitutional’ norms of the legal system are the exclusive source of 
ultimate authority for the legal system. In turn, exclusiveness of source implies 
exhaustiveness of reach. If the constitutional norms are the only basis of authority for the 
legal system, then there is no part of the legal order which  these norms cannot reach, no 
‘lower’ normative arrangements which cannot finally be traced back to the authority of the 
highest norms. That this idea of comprehensive regulatory control is an important aspect of 
the constitutional self-understanding of the EU legal order is underscored by the facts of the  
first two cases in which the ECJ, following its earlier assembly of the building blocks of  
hierarchy in the direct effect and supremacy line of cases,  resorted to a more explicit 
language in describing  the Treaties as the “basic constitutional Charter” of the Community. 
Tellingly, these dealt, respectively, with the exhaustive reach of the ‘rule of law’ within the 
European legal order17 and the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ as the Europolity’s court of 
final authority to determine matters of European law bearing upon the key question of the 
respective competences of Community institutions and the Member States.18  
And where from an internal perspective self-containment or integrity implies 
comprehensive  scope and control, from an external perspective it implies that the EU is a 
separate legal order. Indeed, it is precisely its formal internal ‘completeness’ that vindicates 
its autonomy from other legal orders  Within the self-containment perspective,  in sum,  the 
constitution has a symbiotic relationship with its “own”19  legal order, supplying it with 
identity (internally) and distinctiveness (externally).  
Looking at these four themes of European constitutionalism in the round, in all cases 
we can see the drag of the state tradition. In the case of  nominalism and textualism, this 
operates in a loose ideological manner,  in the very attempt  to invest in the  symbolic 
currency of  the rhetorical language or the documentary form of  a state-centred tradition. 
                                                          
15
  Weiler n13 above, 298. 
16
 See e.g. E. Christodoulidis, Law and Reflexive Politics, (Kluwer: Dordrecht, 1998) esp. chs. 6, 8 and 11-14. 
17
 Case 294/83,Parti ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339 
18
 Opinion 1/91 Re Draft Agreement  on a European Economic Area  [1991] ECR 6102. 
19
 Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL ECR 585 
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In the case of  hierarchy and self-containment,  the connection is deeper and more implicit. 
Here constitutionalism is a metaphor for the emergence and consolidation of the very idea of 
a legal order at the supranational level,  one that draws closely on the idea of legal order 
relevant to statehood and the Westphalian system of states. The combination of epistemic and 
motivational assumptions  involved – that  we are dealing with a  discrete political order 
which best regulates itself in accordance with a unitary framework of authority – may be so 
general and taken-for–granted as often to escape attention, but this is precisely because they 
are so deeply familiar from the social technology of state constitutionalism.  
(ii) New  Governance 
Turning to New Governance, again we confront a concept whose exploration in one 
sense is highly diverse and open-ended, but in another  displays a common limitation. For 
while the specification of what is ‘new’ in  New Governance may be more or less concrete or 
abstract, it invariably turns on a categorical distinction from the ‘old.’ One common starting 
point at the more concrete or institutional end of the spectrum is to define New Governance in 
the EU in  terms of a departure from  the Classic Community Method of norm generation and 
of governance more generally, centring around the Commission right of initiative and the 
legislative and budgetary  powers of the Council of Ministers and European Parliament.20  An 
even  more general variant of the institutionally-centred approach  finds the defining feature 
of New Governance  simply in its non-legislative or only marginally legislative character, 
with the very idea of legislation here operating as a proxy for hierarchy.21.  Such a view, 
indeed, comes very close to defining New Governance as the antithesis of legal ordering as 
commonly conceived, and so, by inference, of constitutional ordering as the most 
fundamental level of legal discourse. 
Other more abstract models are less quick to draw substantive inferences from 
institutional form. They concentrate instead on general properties of new governance, such as 
participation and power-sharing, multi-level integration, diversity and decentralization, 
deliberation, flexibility and revisability of norms, and experimentation and knowledge–
creation.22 From this perspective, various particular regulatory forms can be assessed for their 
New Governance credentials. These include not only the Open Method of Co-ordination -  
the novel decision-making structure based on iterative benchmarking, voluntary national 
compliance and mutual learning that is widely perceived to be the most developed and most 
rapidly spreading form of New Governance – but also older and more familiar devices such 
as partnership arrangements, comitology and even framework directives. The basic premise 
however, remains oppositional. The ‘new’  properties explicitly or implicitly acquire 
definition from their contrast with a model of ‘old’ government  based on representation, 
singular  authority, centralized  command and control, rigidity and stability of norms, and the 
uniform application of a received regulatory formula. 
Clearly, there are dangers in any binary model of regulatory forms or characteristics. 
Such a stylized contrast may mask the fact that  many ‘actually existing’ old forms of 
government tended to  incorporate some new elements, while the new forms continue to 
incorporate aspects of the old. In normative terms too, a binary model may encourage us to 
religiously favour one side in a series of nested oppositions between new and old, progressive 
                                                          
20
 See e.g. J. Scott and D. Trubek, “Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European 
Union” (2002) 8 ELJ 1-18,  at 1.  
21
 See e.g. A. Heritier, “New Modes of Governance In Europe: Policy-making Without Legislating?” in  A. 
Heritier (ed) Common Goods: Reinventing European and international Governance (Boston: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2002) 185-206. 
22
  See e.g Scott and Trubek, n20 above, 5-6. 
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and conservative, and so to discount the resilient worth of some of the old ‘rule of law’ values.  
Yet defenders of  the conceptual currency of New Governance might reasonably  respond that 
their thinking is  alert to the dangers of an unduly dichotomous approach, and that it already 
seeks to counter the inference of mutual exclusivity and to register that the world is invariably 
a more complex place than any strictly binary model allows. In particular, the development of 
a “theory of hybrids,”23  can help us both  with the explanatory question of how old and new 
– hard and soft – combine and interact in practice,  and with the normative question of the 
optimal reconciliation of the virtues associated with each.  
Interesting work on hybridity is indeed emerging, and some of it can be found in the 
present volume.24 For present purposes, however, we should bear in mind the obvious but not 
unimportant point that those for whom New  Governance constitutes an analytical point of 
departure  continue to display a structural predisposition towards the new. In general terms, 
this has to do with the  basic methodology of theory building. New Governance analysis 
proceeds by reference to the Weberian  notion of an ideal (or pure)  type, in which  the 
relations that constitute the   ideal types of new (or, indeed, old) governance are the main 
focus  of inquiry and evaluation, and  provide the basic default account of the world. Indeed, 
the very idea of a hybrid or mixed type  corroborates this founding assumption, as it suggests 
the  primacy of the different   ideal types - or basic species -  from which the hybrid is formed.  
In more specific terms,  bias towards the new is bound up with the awkwardness of   
developing hybrid forms of normative as opposed to explanatory theory. Many of the more  
interesting insights of hybrid theorizing, as suggested by De Burca and Scott’s distinction 
between  baseline, developmental and default hybridity, 25   have to do with the causal 
interface between old and new, where each is conceived in general or holistic terms. Under 
what circumstances and to what extent, they ask, does the old underpin (baseline)  or provide 
a catalyst (developmental) for the new, or, indeed, its disciplining counterfactual (default)?  
And while the answers to these questions are not normatively insignificant, in the sense that 
they show that the basic viability of the new tends to remain dependent upon the old, and also 
demonstrate how some of the normative dividends of the old and new may broadly  co-exist, 
more detailed assessments of the optimal regulatory mix of old and new conceived of as a  set 
of disaggregated norm-characteristics  are harder to come by. This is because, if we dig down 
to the level of constituent variables, elements of the ‘new’ and the ‘old tend to take the form 
of logical opposites (e.g. centralization versus decentralization, singular versus multi-level 
authority, command  versus deliberation,  rigid and stable versus flexible and revisable 
norms), thereby allowing very little analytical leverage for hybrid forms to develop.  Just 
because of the dominance and categorical quality of the initial opposition,  hybridity in a 
normative register, then,  would  seem to push us either towards   a crude and unlikely mix of 
polarized variables drawn from  the opposite camps of new and old (e.g., deliberatively 
produced but rigidly and stably articulated and applied norms)  or, if we seek to hybridize 
each individual variable, towards the descriptively bereft balancing point (e.g., relatively 
(de)centralized, or relatively (in)flexible), or, in some cases, logically incoherent ‘excluded 
middle’  (e.g., relatively singular?)  between these polarized variables. 
The instant point is not, however,  to question the long- term potential of hybridity as 
a way of moderating the analysis of New Governance,  or perhaps as a  promissory note to 
rethink the whole explanatory .and normative paradigm of supranational regulatory 
                                                          
23
  D. Trubek and L. Trubek . “Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the role of the Open 
Method of Co-ordination” (2005) 11 ELJ  343-364, at 364.  
24
  As previewed by De Burca and Scott, n1 above.  
25
  Ibid 
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innovation.26 Rather, it is simply to confirm that  the basic analytical frame through which we 
construct the idea of  New Governance creates a  propensity towards  oppositional thinking, 
and since the adoption of that frame tends in any case to be linked with an interest in an and 
openness towards the affirmative possibilities of the new,  this may result in the integrity and 
virtue of the new relative to the old to be exaggerated.  
In a nutshell, then, we may observe that  the problems associated with 
constitutionalism at the supranational level seem to find their negative image in the case of 
New Governance. For if, despite its diversity and internal divisions,  constitutional discourse 
remains constrained by the legacy of an old paradigm, New Governance analysis,  by contrast, 
and again notwithstanding its significant internal differences, risks being in excessive thrall to 
the new. Let us now seek to examine the implications of this disjuncture between old-
fashioned and new-fashioned  in terms of the various candidate relationships between 
constitutionalism and New Governance.  
 
3.   Some Candidate Relationships 
 
If we recall the four major themes of European constitutionalism, we can now suggest 
how each of these provides the basis for one possible relationship between constitutionalism 
and New Governance In each case, however, as intimated earlier, the connection is in some 
significant sense limited or compromised.  
 To begin again from a nominalist perspective,  here we can conceive of the 
relationship between constitutionalism and New Governance in terms of  the subsumption of 
the latter under the former. If constitutionalism is such an open-ended discourse at the 
supranational level,  lacking even the minimal constraints set by institutional and textual path-
dependence at the state level and a certain set of social-technological assumptions about what 
is available as constitutional resources, plausible as constitutional technique and appropriate 
as constitutional purpose, then what is to stop us just calling New Governance 
“constitutional”?  By a simple strategy of naming –  of updating the constitutional catalogue 
in the light of fresh developments – do we not thereby resolve  any tensions between 
constitutionalism and New Governance?  
There are two cumulative objections to such an approach. The first is that  if 
constitutional discourse is so ubiquitous, so stretched by ideological whim and strategy, then 
its invocation may come to lack any significance other than as a rhetorical device.  If 
constitutionalism is everywhere, then nowhere, the realm of  New Governance included,  can 
it claim a special authority, or  lend its object some special appropriateness to or core 
significance within  supranational governance relations.  Secondly, the dilution of 
constitutional discourse to the point that  a claim made in the  name of the constitution carries 
no special authority within or special relevance to  governance does not, however, imply  that 
in practice  there is a constitutional ‘flatland’;  for, as we shall see,  a higher priority or 
greater authority may continue to be accorded  to certain types of  arrangements over others 
within the positive law and institutional workings of the supranational system. Indeed, the 
development of a more ‘democratic’ constitutional rhetoric may actually reinforce this to the 
extent that its permissive message  distracts attention from the resilience of  underlying 
authority structures. 
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 For thoughtful discussion, see Trubek and Trubek, n23 above. For reasons set out in the text above and 
further developed in section 4(a) below, however,   the ‘hybridity’ concept may be more useful in alerting us to 
some of the outstanding problems with the new governance approach than in resolving these problems.   
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For its part, the textualist strain within supranational constitutional thinking fits  with 
a instrumentalist conception of the relationship between  the constitution and New 
Governance. Most immediately, the new Constitutional Treaty can be viewed as an 
instrument through which New Governance  in general, and the OMC in particular  find 
articulation in the higher echelons of the EU’s regulatory system. The story of OMC’s fate in 
the Constitutional Treaty has been told in detail elsewhere,27 and here is not the place to 
repeat it. However, a number of features deserve mention insofar as they demonstrate the 
strengths and drawbacks of the textualist approach, and indeed point us towards other 
potential limitations of the  constitutional vision. 
First,  to repeat a point, as with all constitutional texts at their  point of emergence, 
how the Constitutional Treaty addresses the matter of New Governance  is in significant part 
a function of power politics. Yet far more so than at the level of the state, where – for better 
or for worse – even at transformative constitutional moments the basic structural principle of 
the polity, namely that of an entity with formally unlimited capacity to act,  is regarded as 
relatively settled, such power politics at the EU level tend to respond to a double agenda, one 
of  both “blueprint” and “generative” politics.28 The treatment of the OMC, accordingly,  
reflects  a complex compromise over two cross-cutting macro-political questions. One  
involves the traditional right/left question of the emphasis to be placed on ‘ Social Europe’ – 
the focus of key OMCs in economic policy, employment strategy, social inclusion, pensions 
etc., -   as a countervailing force to the single market, and the other involving the underlying 
structural question of the proper extent of the EU’s  (as opposed to Member State) 
competences. As with many multi-level, intersecting  compromises, because of the high 
number of veto strategies in play, its articulation has been  largely negative –  more about 
soothing diverse anxieties than pursuing divisive aspirations.  On the one hand, therefore, we 
find that social policy aims central to so many OMCs, and so indirectly the OMC itself,  are 
boosted in the general statement of values and objectives in the opening provisions of the 
Constitutional Treaty,29 in the ‘second generation’ Equality and Solidarity Chapters of the 
Charter on Fundamental  Rights30 and in a new horizontal clause committing the Union to 
take account of various social polices and objectives in defining and implementing specific 
polices and actions.31  Yet, on the other hand, for all that the co-ordination of economic and 
employment policies is treated as a distinctive mode of competence in the CT,32 nowhere  in 
the text is the OMC granted explicit constitutional status. This silence, it has been argued, 
resulted from a deadlock or compromise within  the Praesidium of the Convention which 
produced the draft Constitutional Treaty between those from a state-centred perspective who 
were concerned at  the OMC’s potential for ‘soft’ erosion of national policy prerogatives and 
those of a more communautaire disposition who were concerned at its  possible undermining 
of classic “hard’ supranational competences. 33 Trapped between these two opposing fears, it 
ultimately proved impossible for OMC to find its own distinctive constitutional voice. 
                                                          
27
 See e.g. G. de Burca, “The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the European Union” (2003) 28 
ELR, 814-839, at 830 et seq. 2003; J.  Zeitlin, “Social Europe and Experimentalist Governance”  in G de Burca 
(ed) EU Law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity (Oxford: OUP, 2005) 213-241. 
28
 D. Miliband. “Introduction” in D. Miliband (ed) Reinventing the Left (Cambridge: Polity, 1994) 1-17 at 5  
29
 CT Art. I-3 
30
 CT Part II 
31
 CT Art. III-117. 
32
 CT Art. 1-15. 
33
 Zeitlin, n 27 above, at 230. 
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In the second place,  the debate on the place of the OMC in the constitutional text 
rather  underlines the poverty of attempts to think through the idea of postnational 
constitutionalism in social-technological terms. No constitutional text is self-implementing, 
least of all one which lacks the epistemic frame of the statist model, yet remarkably little 
attention seems to have been paid to this fact. Commenting on  the possible impact of the 
relevant sections of the approved  constitutional  text, and indeed of the alternative option of a 
generic OMC clause dedicated to asserting high standards of procedural ‘due process’,34 one 
observer has  remarked that while it appears to be common ground that “constitutional 
provisions… matter in the EU” in particular through conferring “added legitimacy”  there is 
nevertheless “no clear answer”35 to what extent they matter, or how their impact percolates 
through and resonates within the system. This neatly captures the widespread and complacent 
assumption within the Constitutional Treaty debate that putting things on a constitutional 
footing would somehow in and of itself be consequential rather than simply marking another 
consequence – the  point at which political compromise had been reached 
Two questions are begged by the assumption of consequentiality. First, and more 
generally, what basic difference does juridification of New Governance, or indeed any new 
form of normative ordering make?  If and to the extent that  the constitutional text were to  
impose precise or unavoidable  new obligations or confer wide-ranging new powers on key 
organs of government or other agencies, then there might seem to be a relatively simple 
answer to this at the level of  normative authorization. But  none of the new provisions, 
dealing as they do with the designation of vague objectives and general rights and  the 
affirmation of broad jurisdictions, actually possesses that kind of semantic sting. It is difficult 
to see, in other words, how these provisions could be decisive in persuading or compelling 
key governance institutions to do what they were not otherwise minded to do, or in 
empowering anyone do what they were not already capable of doing.  
 And even if this were not so, a second  set of questions of the added value of calling 
the text constitutional, rather than merely legal, remains unanswered.  Inasmuch as the 
general legal code makes a difference, does the invocation of the special constitutional code 
make a further difference?  Alternatively, even if the conferral of simple legal status makes 
little or no difference, might the conferral of constitutional status not still do so?  
One possible answer suggested by the other two themes of EU constitutionalism - 
hierarchy and self-containment, is that any difference constitutionalisation  makes to the 
promotion of  New Governance is more likely to be negative rather than positive. If we take 
first  the theme of hierarchy, the danger is that this simply fails to correspond to or recognize 
the operating logic of  New Governance. On this view,  much of what  goes on in the 
“underworld”36 of New Governance is hardly touched upon  by a constitutional model which 
is fixated with pedigree norms and the commanding institutional heights of the Community 
method.37  At best, then,  constitutionalism and New Governance are merely  ships in the 
night, navigating their very different routes with scarcely a passing glance. And indeed, any 
attempt at greater familiarity,  involving the examination of New Governance thorough a 
                                                          
34
  For its elaboration and discussion, see G. de Burca and J. Zeitlin, “ Constitutionalizing the Open Method of 
Co-ordination: What Should the Convention Propose?” (2003)  CEPS Policy Brief 31. 
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 Zeitlin, n27 above, at 240. 
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Infranationalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy’ in C. Joerges and E. Vos (eds) EU Committees: Social 
Regulation, Law and Politics (Oxford: Hart, 1999) 339-350.  
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of the Constitutional Moment,”  (2004) 11 Constellations   368-392. 
Constitutionalism and New Governance in the European Union: Rethinking the Boundaries 
 
11 
constitutional lens, merely underlines the difficulties involved in trying to reconcile two such 
diverse operating logics. Thus, to return to the debates on the Constitutional Treaty, one 
objection to the naming and constitutional anchoring of OMC was  that it would, at least 
implicitly, involve locating OMC in a strict hierarchy of forms of  Community governance, 
either trumping and displacing or being trumped and displaced by certain pre-existing hard  
competences.38 Yet the emergence and implementation of many New Governance measures 
are not well understood  in terms of their place in a pecking order of regulatory modalities, 
but rather as a set of mechanisms that through content-dependent persuasion and good 
practice can variously complement, supplement, challenge, modify, anticipate or consolidate 
content-independent forms of vertically-ordered  authority. The danger, then,  in trying to 
reduce OMC mechanisms to a logic which is commensurable with, and so competitive within, 
a hierarchy of forms,  is of forcing square pegs into round constitutional holes. 
 If we move to the related idea of self-containment, the mismatch between the social 
technology of traditional constitutionalism and that of New Governance is even more 
pronounced, and indeed allows us to  contemplate the possibility of a structural antagonism 
between the two.  Constitutional self-containment, as noted earlier, has both internal and 
external dimensions, and each threatens a key dimension of New Governance. Internally, the 
idea that constitutional authority is exclusive and exhaustive – a preordained unitary order 
externally imposed upon its objects -   does not  fit easily with the idea of OMC as a shifting 
series of  experimental and open-ended frameworks of  voluntary compliance and emergent  
self-authorization. This tension we can see, for example, in the reluctance of some to 
contemplate  any form of freeze frame constitutionalization of the OMC in the Constitutional 
Treaty for fear that it might undermine its trademark flexibility and interrupt its dynamic path 
of development.39  
Externally, if anything the tension is even more profound. Self-containment, as we 
have seen, is intimately linked to the idea of the EU as a distinct and separate legal-
constitutional order. Yet so much of what is key to the social technology of EU 
constitutionalism clearly has a relational dimension.40In simple terms, the EU shares both  
territory and people with its Member States, and we cannot conceive of the guiding norms of 
the EU, the nature of its societal steering mechanisms or the motivations of its citizens in 
isolation from these state structures. This relational feature is never more pronounced than in 
the context of New Governance in general and OMC in particular, where it is precisely the 
failure to agree a definitive and authoritative division of competence and the recognition of 
the   artificiality of such partitions as are in place  which has provided much of the impetus 
for reform, and for thinking about the connection between legal orders in more fluid terms.41  
4. The Mutual (Re)Engagement  of  Constitutionalism and New Governance 
(a) New Governance Reconsidered 
 It would seem, then, that constitutionalism may offer either  too little or too much to 
New Governance. Too little, if wearing its nominalist clothes, constitutionalism becomes a 
bland affair  – an everyday  mantra  with no analytical bite; or, if wearing its textualist clothes, 
it is instead fated to be the casualty of complex multi-level political gridlock. Too much, if 
the resilient constitutional codes of hierarchy and self-containment – inherited from the state 
but strongly reasserted in the foundational stages of the EU,  colonize and subvert attempts 
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made in the name of New Governance to rethink regulation for a post-Westphalian age. 
Perhaps, then, New Governance has nothing to gain from constitutionalism, other than the 
instrumental benefits which may accrue to New Governance’s supporters through the 
strategic assertion of a symbolically powerful language in which to couch their claims. Even 
here, however, any victory threatens to be a Pyrrhic one if the price of adoption of the 
constitutional register is deference to a social technology which is ultimately at odds with that 
which animates New Governance.   
 Before any such dismissive conclusion were drawn, however,  New Governance 
would have to meet its own high standards of justification and demonstrate that it was not in 
need of any external forms of normative support . Yet in its fixation with ‘the new’, New 
Governance, as we have already noted, reveals  significant  weak points and blind spots. And 
insofar as these point to important deficiencies and limitations, might not  ‘old’ 
constitutionalism offer as yet unconsidered means of assisting in overcoming these?    
 Earlier we identified  New Governance’s preoccupation with a binary logic as leaving 
it with little sense of  the value, if any, of anything other than New Governance. Certainly in 
its more rigid formulations, the binary mode of identifying  New Governance as an important 
empirical and/or normative force either suggests that  ‘old’ governance’ is increasingly 
insignificant and/or bereft of value, or, even if it stops short of any such  categorical dismissal, 
it nevertheless offers us no clear way of understanding or assessing just how such older forms, 
with their opposite or countervailing regulatory logic, are supposed to complement New 
Governance. The turn to hybridity, as we saw,  signals some recognition of these problems 
and some attempt to move beyond them, but the legacy of the original approach is hard to 
shake off. Either we end up dealing in causal relationships between the old and the new 
conceived of as very broad generalities, or, if we take a disaggregative approach,  we struggle 
for an effective conceptual language in which to think through the recombination of old and 
new.  
 If we try to locate what lies  at the root of these difficulties, we may find it in the 
intensity of focus of the New Governance approach upon matters of institutional design. Such 
a narrow   preoccupation entails that questions  such as  the deep philosophy of governance 
and of political organisation which should animate that   design or the wider social and 
political context in which the relevant institutions are embedded, tend to be ignored or 
relegated to secondary consideration. This is  most obvious in the  more concrete 
formulations of  the New Governance approach, where we see a kind of institutional 
fetishism in which  different institutional configurations  are treated as surrogates for the 
pursuit of some values rather than others. Yet even in the more abstract formulations of New 
Governance,  we find only a more elaborate route to the same kind of decontextualized 
institutional conclusion. In  emphasizing the context-independent value of matters such as 
participation, multi-level integration, diversity, deliberation, flexibility and experimental 
learning, New Governance analysis seems intent on supplying  the key ingredients necessary 
for any institutional concoction to pass the ‘good governance’ test.  
 Indeed, much of the appeal of the New Governance approach seems to lie precisely in 
the priority it accords to the ‘practical’ business of supplying a checklist of  widely affirmed 
regulatory desiderata. This is stressed far more than  the inevitably more divisive question of 
an overall conception of governance which would relate and prioritize these various 
desiderata both  inter se and  with regard to other governance values, and which would seek 
to ground the whole in its overall social and political context of emergence and ramification. 
Yet the very concentration on a  broadly palatable  institutional recipe which is the source of 
much of its attraction may also be the  most serious shortcoming of New Governance analysis 
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to the extent that it  leads to avoidance or downgrading  of these domains of inquiry where 
New Governance analysis is most vulnerable.  
We may demonstrate this, paradoxically, by considering one of the   contributions to 
New Governance analysis which has taken these questions of governance philosophy and 
wider socio-political context  seriously, namely the work of the influential democratic 
experimentalist or pragmatist school.42 According to  the experimentalists,  the promise of 
New Governance in general and OMC in particular lies in their method of addressing  the 
tension between two aspirations of democratic authority. For democratic government is only 
acceptable if it both produces well-informed decisions that provide practical solutions to 
collective action problems, and  allows participation and voice to those affected by such 
decisions. Whereas many theories of governance struggle to reconcile these two aspirations, 
and tend either to subordinate knowledge to voice or voice to knowledge, the experimentalist 
approach seeks to discover and exploit contexts of action in which the two can be optimally 
combined. For the experimentalists, a ‘bottom-up’ perspective, one whose point of departure 
is self-constituting practical problem-solving units or constituencies (who tend to be groups at 
the receiving end of classic command and control public sector performance) provides the 
best way of proceeding. It allows the ‘demos’ to find its own highly localized level, one 
where voice is most effective, knowledge and experience most relevant, and motivation most 
palpable. On this view, the attraction of  OMC and the like is that they are sensitive to the 
primacy of  localized understanding and praxis while offering a template in terms of which 
local solutions  can be pooled, exchanged and developed and activity co-ordinated beyond the 
level of the basic problem-solving unit. 
In developing a fully fledged and socially grounded regulatory philosophy  along 
these lines, the experimentalist approach dramatizes two particular types of problem for New 
Governance. In the first place,  there is the problem of the guarantee of the basic regulatory 
frame or  structure of any institutional design, and, in the second place, there is the problem 
of the specification of the appropriate boundaries of governance. 
The problem of the guarantee of the basic regulatory frame has in fact two dimensions, 
each of which is implicit in all forms of New Governance and  becomes  explicit in the face 
of the clear normative priorities of experimentalism. The first  addresses the relationship 
between new and old, and asks, how, in the sacrifice or  subservience of  ‘old’ values such as 
stability and predictability of norms to the demands of experimental learning  we can 
continue to ensure or even presume against the erosion of  these norms that we may argue are 
universal, or at least of resilient relevance across time and space.43 The second concerns the 
danger of institutional entropy. How, given the experimentalist  and ‘bottom-up’ basic thrust, 
can we find an institutional form which has the basic coherence and integrity even to 
guarantee its own self-reproduction? Is there not a danger either that New Governance in its 
emphasis upon relentless revisability contains the seeds of its own destruction, or, 
alternatively,  that it opens itself to the charge of performative contradiction by placing 
certain anchoring premises beyond the possibility of experimental rejection?44    
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 As regards the specification of the appropriate boundaries of governance and of 
democratic self-constitution, again the explicitness of the experimentalist approach places the 
problem of New Governance in sharp relief.  Whereas the  emphasis upon a certain bundle of 
regulatory desiderata  regardless of context  means that it is often left unclear in New 
Governance analysis at what level of government and to what extent these values should be 
articulated, experimentalism puts its cards firmly on the table in its identification of  the coal-
face, problem-solving entity as the primary unit of analysis. Yet considerations of justice, co-
ordination and  existing political culture mean that this cannot be the only key boundary for 
the experimentalists. As regards justice, since different problem-solving sectors are not 
hermetically sealed off from one another, but take decisions that involve significant 
externalities and indirectly affect a wide range of interests,  there has to be a wider context in 
which these external effects can be addressed and balanced. As regards co-ordination, the 
very idea of mutual learning and adjustment within and across different OMCs and other 
experimental regulatory contexts presupposes a delimited zone, whether of functional activity 
or territory, within which such co-ordination takes place. 
 Both of these factors suggest the state, and, more importantly for present purposes, 
the supranational level - given the significant extant  ordering and co-ordinating power of 
each - as other  sites and ‘outer boundaries’ of political organisation beyond  the basic 
problem-solving units.  Finally, the special suitability of New Governance in general and 
OMC in particular to the wider European supranational context is explicitly argued for by 
advocates of experimentalism on grounds of an existing framework of political 
understandings and the growing perception within that framework of the need for a revision 
and a renewal of the Community method.45  On this view, against a background of growing 
collective anxiety as to the incapacitating inflexibility of classic Community command-and-
control decision-making procedures,  the new more permissive regulatory capacities of New 
Governance are  required to enhance  deliberative opportunities and secure the levels of  
collective trust necessary to persuade Member States to relax their de facto or de jure veto 
powers sufficiently to save the overall EU system from gridlock. Here, then, the European 
level is presupposed not just as an objective source of authority, but appealed to as  a 
subjective source of an ongoing commitment – as indispensable as it is elusive -   to put 
things in common.        
(b) Reflexive Constitutionalism 
 Taken together, the problem of anchoring the basic regulatory structure and the 
necessity of providing a framework of political community other and wider than that of the 
various problem-solving constituencies do indeed provide a significant challenge to New 
Governance. However, it is a challenge that may be met  provided that we look again at the 
resources of authoritative ordering that may be available through the perspective of 
constitutionalism.    
In one sense, this may seem only too obvious a conclusion. As we have already seen, 
an important part of the constitutional tradition, including the oldest vector of  EU 
constitutionalism, is concerned with the provision of a  basic legal framework of political 
community which both trumps and is  generative of other norms. Equally, that part of the 
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tradition of constitutionalism which focuses not on the universality of norms of good 
governance but on the particularity of the polity has always been concerned with the bonds of 
affinity within even very large communities and with how these may be mobilised  within a 
coherent social technology. Yet while these ‘constitutional resources’ seem to address the 
problems of regulatory anchorage and the construction of a wider framework of political 
community respectively, they threaten to do so by reasserting just  these features of 
constitutionalism which are in most obvious tension with New Governance. What price the 
constitutionalization of New Governance if it brings back into the picture the   rigid 
normative and institutional hierarchy and comprehensive self-containment that New 
Governance seeks to overcome? And what price the constitutionalization of New Governance 
if it falls victim to a kind of false essentialism – a “personification” 46 of  abstract community 
which masks very particular interests in the name of an illusionary notion of the settled 
common interest, and which, indeed, provides the dubious ideological ballast to support the 
hierarchical operating logic  and comprehensive pretensions of old-fashioned 
constitutionalism ?  
In the most general terms, the prospect of EU constitutionalism offering a solution to 
the deficiencies of New Governance without undermining its basic purpose depends upon EU 
constitutionalism  nurturing  a quality which it actually shares in common with the 
experimentalist version of New Governance, namely an intense reflexivity. To be ‘reflexive’ 
means that something is capable of  bending or turning back on itself. This amounts to more 
than a  providing a ‘reflection’ – an inert mirror or faithful model of a prior essence. Rather, it 
is about the possession of the quality of ipseity -  of the  capacity for self-reflection and the 
possibility of self-transformation inherent in that capacity. 47  
 How does it help to reconceive  of constitutionalism in  reflexive terms?  It does so 
by allowing us to think of constitutionalism as the carrier of a generic idea of responsible self-
government.48  The idea of responsible self-government is inherently reflexive in that  it 
involves a self-assertion and a taking of responsibility as two sides of a single coin. By 
conceiving of itself in constitutional terms the EU is indeed, as many of the sceptics  fear, 
making a claim to autonomy, of being a political community in its own right rather than 
merely a delegated and subordinate form of political authority, albeit a political community 
which  co-exists with and  does not in turn  seek to subordinate other and  overlapping 
political communities at state and sub-state level. And in making that claim to autonomy, the 
EU  also must perforce  accept  full responsibility for its own affairs before both internal and 
external audiences. Constitutionalism, then,  is the language in which both the assertion is 
made and the responsibility taken  
Constitutionalism is thus  revealed as the indispensable “discourse of 
conceptualization and imagination”49 whereby any polity conceives and thus constitutes itself 
as such.  On this view the ‘old’ state tradition of constitutionalism  need not be viewed in 
either of the negative ways portrayed earlier - neither as a  paralyzing  legacy handed down 
from a quite different political context nor as a source of indiscriminate borrowing and purely 
opportunistic rhetoric. Rather, the state is but one species of the genus of responsible self-
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government, the supranational entity known as the EU another, and  the generic idea itself  
the only basis on which we can meaningfully translate between the two contexts. 
But, what, in more detail, should the generic idea of responsible self-government 
imply at the EU level?  It was suggested above that for reflexive constitutionalism to 
complement and augment new governance in the EU  such reflexivity should be intensely 
pursued. That is to say, it is not enough simply for the EU merely to style itself as a reflexive 
entity. Indeed, to do things merely  in the name of responsible self-government can lead to 
precisely the type of ‘personification’ of a regulatory configuration – its reification as 
something possessing its own interests -   that many proponents of New Governance fear.50 
Rather,  intense reflexivity implies  close and persistent attention to the conditions in which 
and purposes for which the very idea of  the responsible self-government of a collectivity 
may be justified.  
 These conditions and purposes concern the basis on which the collective ‘self’ may 
be identified and the collective ends it seeks vindicated. Crucially, in this regards, one of the 
apparent constitutional weaknesses of the EU may turn out be a strength. It will be recalled 
that a key element in the social technology of state constitutionalism is its epistemic 
dimension – its understanding of the key generative mechanisms of the political society in 
question. Typically in the state context this involves some notion of a prior bonding element 
or source of affinity,  and the danger is that the constitution merely ‘reflects’ this rather than 
undertake a ‘reflexive’ engagement’ with it. In the context of the EU  no such hostages to 
collective fortune exist. There are no credible candidates to invest collective selfhood with a 
fixed prior meaning, and thus every opportunity exists for the sense of self-understanding to 
be constructed or transformed in the process of collective engagement itself. Or to put it 
another way, while the staple puzzle of state constitutionalism as a form of social technology 
has been to harness  understanding of the  epistemic  foundations of the political society to 
the task of  ongoing mobilization of collective action, the staple puzzle of  EU 
constitutionalism as a form of social technology is instead to establish a more basic or 
threshold motivation to put things in common sufficient to construct such a shared epistemic 
frame.  The only justification of the constitutional process, then, - including but by no means 
limited to the initial formal process of Constitution-making -  lies not in the vindication of 
some existing essence or realisation of inherent potential, but  in the productive potential of 
the process itself in creating and redeeming a sense of collective ‘selfhood’ or political 
community  out of the emergent awareness of common interests it stimulates.  
It is quite possible to imagine such a  de-reified conception of constitutional order 
responding to the wider concerns of New Governance. A reflexive constitutionalism should 
be one with the collective awareness and imaginative resources necessary to secure a 
conceptual anchor which specifies the default generative structure and normative priorities of 
the whole without reverting to the statist notion of a rigid and inflexible institutional 
hierarchy that would confront New Governance with various false choices, (e.g. both 
normative and institutional hierarchy or neither;  rigid textual specification or constitutional 
silence,  external authorization or self-authorization, )  or, indeed – to recall another feature of 
the statist legacy – which is able to conceive of the relational or trans-polity dimension of 
New Governance networks.  Indeed,  the major impediments to such a process of 
constitutional reimagining are practical and ideological rather than cognitive.51 On the one 
hand, as we have seen, the practical context of constitution-making invariably pits different 
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blueprint and generative conceptions of politics against one another, and may result in uneasy 
and epistemically inarticulate compromises. On the other hand, the very idea of a conceptual 
anchorage, however light, contingent and flexible, retains an idea of content-independent 
authoritative foundations about which partisans of New Governance remain highly 
ambivalent.52  
Yet a reflexive constitutionalism should also be able to overcome these practical 
obstacles and address these ideological concerns. For it should be capable of  persuasively 
disseminating  the idea that what  binds the wider political community is no more and no less 
than the shared pragmatic desire to identify and secure whatever may be in the collective 
interest,  including the conditions under which other and more intimate levels of political 
community or common action identified by new governance analysis as key political sites  
can thrive and interact in a just and well-co-ordinated manner. Such a pragmatic sense of 
constitutionalism  both responds to  the sceptical fear that constitution-making is simply 
(supranational) state-building by another name through the modesty and self-discipline of its 
ambitions, and answers the anti-foundationalist concern of the supporter of New Governance 
through asserting that the  only content-independent ‘foundation’ involved is that minimally 
required and presupposed in order to justify and enable the search for content-dependent 
solutions to collective action problems.   
Of course, to end on a sober note, whether any such de-reified and thoroughly 
reflexive conception of constitutionalism is likely to ‘catch on’ at the EU level is quite 
another question. Many of the sceptics who have opposed the present documentary process 
with such success have done so precisely because they will not be convinced that the 
state/.supranational relationship need not be  negative-sum, and so wish to reject or neuter the 
idea of a new transnational collective political entity to stand alongside the states. Others 
have done so because, while perhaps less sceptical in principle,  they are unhappy about the 
embryonic political personality or unsure about the likely mature political personality of the 
new collective self, and not prepared to take any chances.53  If we take the idea of a reflexive 
constitutionalism in the uncharted  postnational conditions of European supranationalism 
seriously,  the latter objection should be no more valid than the former, since the personality 
of the collective should remain within the exclusive gift of the individuals who construct and 
comprise that collective. It is  perhaps the deepest and most disabling paradox of European 
constitutionalism, however, that this can only ever be demonstrated in the doing,  and that the 
discovery of the collective commitment  to become and remain engaged with an ongoing  
constitutional experiment  can never await the proof that such  collective commitment is 
indeed worthwhile.  
 
                                                          
52
 See most recently, J. Cohen and C. Sabel, “Extra Rempublicam, Nulla Justita?”  Philosophy and Public 
Affairs (forthcoming) 
53
  See e.g. N. Walker, “Europe’s Constitutional Engagement” (2005) 18 Ratio Juris  385.   
